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J-UDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMITAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE
CHESTER G. VERNIER, ELMER A. WILCOX, WILLiA G. HALE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
State v. Stevens, N. H. 99 Ati. 723. Sales of lightning rods: "privileges and
iminunities." Laws 1915, c. 128, regulating the sale of lightning rods, section 3,
providing .that an agent under a license from the insurance commissioner shall
be a resident of the state, if a discrimination against citizens of other states,
is one that the state could lawfully make, and so is not violative of Const. U. S.,
art. 4, sec. 2, par. 1, providing that the citizens of each state shall be entitled
to all the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several states, or the
Fourteenth Amendment, prohibiting any state from making or enforcing any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the -United
States.
State v. Collins. Wash. 161 Pac. 467. Validity of statutf regulating opera-
tion of jitney busses. Laws of 1915, page 227, requiring bonds from motor
vehicles, but not from street car companies, does not violation Constitution,
article 1, section 12, prohibiting class legislation, since the distinction is rea-
sonable.
Nor is it invalid because it requires a security company's bond from jitney
busses without providing for bonds of other companies, since the requirement
is presumably reasonable.
Nor is it valid because it exempts carriers of United States mail from its
provisions.
Nor does it violate Constitution, article 1, section 9, providing that no per-
son shall be compelled in a cimin al case to give evidence against himself, and
that there shall be no imprisonment for debt except in case of absconding
debtors.
Nor does it unconstitutionally take property without due process of law.
HomicIDE.
Parker v. State. Wyo. 161 Pac. 552. "Premeditated malice!' In a homi-
cide case, it was error to instruct that to constitute "premeditated malice" no
particular time need intervene between the formation of tle intention and the
act, but it is enough if the intent to commit the act with the full appreciation
of the result likely to follow was present at the time the act was committed;
such instruction in effect stating that defendant could be found guilty of murder
in the first degree if the intent to kill was present in defendant's mind when
the act was committed.
Where, in a capital case, it clearly appears from the record that such error
has been committed as amounted to a denial of substantial justice and deprived
defendant of a fair trial, the judgment should be reversed, though proper ex-
ceptions were not taken below.
INDICTMENT. -
State v. Laflamme. Me. 99 At. 772. Typographical error in caption. 'An
indictment for maintaining a liquor nuisance of' which the typewritten caption
alleged that it was found at a term of the Supreme Judicial Court at a certain
place on the second Tuesday in October in the year one thousand nine hundred
and "fieteen," and alleging the offense to have been committed on August 15,
1915, and between that date and the finding of the indictment was valid; the
word "fieteen" being a palpable typographical error for "fifteen."
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INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION.
State v. Curley. Okla. 161 Pac. 831. Forgery: sufficiency: variance. Where
an information charged that the defendant uttered, and passed a forged check,
but did not plead the names of the indorsers on the back of the check, held, that
it was error for the trial court to hold that the information was defective,
because it did not plead the names indorsed on the back of the check. This
was error, for the reason that these names did not constitute any essential of
the crime charged. Also held that, when this checl was introduced in evidence,-
it was error for the court to hold that, because the names indorsed on the
back of it were not pleaded in the information, there was a fatal variance
between the proof and the allegations of the information. This was error
because the crime charged was that the forged check had been uttered and
passed, and the only function that the names of the indorsers on the back of
the check performed was to furnish evidence as to tle identity of the parties
who uttered and passed the check.
Lopiez v. State. Ariz. 161 Pac. 874. Sufficiency. An information for mur-
der, the commencement of which recited "F. L. accused," etc., omitting the verb
"is" before the word "accused," held sufficient, under Pen. Code 1913, section
943; the defect, if any, being one that could be cured by amendment, if timely
objected to, and which is otherwise deemed cured by reference to the record.
People v. Carrell. Calif. 161 Pac. 994. Sufficiency. An information chafrg-
ing accused with committing "the acts technically known as fellatio," (quoted
from the statute) made a felony by 1915 Pen. Code, section 288a, is fatally
defective because not stating the offense so as to enable a person of ordinary
understanding to know what is intended, as required by Pen. Code, section 950.
"Uifexplained, the word 'fellatio' would, to a man of common understanding
(indeed, we think also to one of uncommon understanding) be as cabalistic as
if written in Egyptian of Mexican hieroglyphics or in Japanese or Chinese
characters."
LARCENY.
Clark v. State. Ga. 91 S. E. 231. Return of stolen property. The evidence
in this case, though circumstantial, is sufficient to exclude-every other reasonable
hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. Therefore the verdict finding
him guilty of sheep stealing, which has the approval of the trial judge, will not
be disturbed, although it does appear, as counsel for the plaintiff in error insist,
that the stolen sheep came back, as was true in the case of "Bo-Peep," which
is respectfully submitted to us as authority. While the sheep came back, it
does not appear that this act on the part of the sheep is in any wise conclusive
that they had not been in fact taken and carried away, as alleged in the indict-
ment; it being entirely for the jury to say whether or not an extended search
by the prosecutor, armed with a search warrant, made some three weeks before
the home-coming of the sheep, of which the accused had actual notice, may not
have influenced the return of the sheep.
SENTENCE.
State v. Lottridge. Ida. 162 Pac. 672. Error in form of sentence under
indeterminate sentence law. Under the indeterminate sentence law of this state
(Sess. Laws 1909, p. 82) any attempt by the trial court to fix a maximum sen-
tence in a criminal case, where such sentence is fixed by law, is surplussage,
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and it is not reversible error, where the trial court fixed a sentence at not less
than one year and not more than fourteen years, when the statute fixes the
maximum penalty at twenty years' imprisonment.
WHITE SLAVE AcT.
Caminetti v.'U. S. Diggs v. U. S. 37 Sup. Ct. Repr. 192. ,White Slave Act
construed; non-mercenary transportation. Transportation of a woman in inter-
stale commerce in order that she may be debauched or become a mistress or
concubine, although unaccompanied by the expectation of pecuniary gain, is
condemned by the provisions of the White Slave Traffic Act of June 25, 1910
(36 Stat. at L. 825, chap. 395, Comp. Stat., 1913, sec. 8813), making it an offense
knowingly to transport or cause to be transported in interstate commerce any
woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other
immoral purpose, or with the intent or purpose to induce such woman or girl
to become a prostitute, or to give herself up to debauchery, or engage in any
other immoral practice.
The name given tq a congressional enactment by way of designation or
description in the act or the report of the committee accompanying the intro-
duction of the bill into the House of Representatives cannot change the plain
implication of the words of the statute.
White, C. J., McKenna, Clarke, J. J., dissenting.
CoRPus DELICTI.
Choate v. State. Okla. 160 Pac. 34. Sufficiency of proof based wholly on
uncorroborated extrajudicial confession of the accused.
In an action for embezzlement where the state proved by competent and
sufficient evidence, the fiduciary position of the accused and his receipt of the
funds and the failure to account for them at the proper time, but failed to
prove that he did not have them at the time of the trial, except by his own
extrajudicial confession of misappropriation. Held, that the court erred in
leaving the case to the jury.
This case raises two questions:
1. Whether the state prove the corpus delicti.
2. Whether the uncorroborated extrajudicial confession of the accused is
sufficient to establish that element.
Both of these rules are directly traceable to a quotation from Lord Hale,
to the effect that'no one should be convicted of larceny without proof that
goods were stolen or for murder without proof that the alleged victims were
dead. Hale, Pleas of the Crown II, 290. On principle and by weight of an-
thority the corpus delicti consists only of the fact of loss, though some courts
include the fact that it was caused by some criminal agency. III Wig. Evidence,
section 2072, sub-section 1. The first rule in this proper form, though the
necessity for it except as a caution to the jury similar to the reasonable doubt
rule in weighing the evidence rather than as a rule of law which might compel
the court to refuse to let the case go to the jury, may be doubted, seems at least
harmless as it is hardly possible that any jury at the present time would convict
even without this rule where there was neither direct nor circumstantial evidence
of the corpus delidti.
But the second rule seems open to much more objection. Where it is fol-
lowed, 'there is considerable doubt as to the kind of corroboration necessary.
Some courts require only general corroboration such as to inspire confidence in
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the confession. Bergen v. People, 17 Ill. 426. While others require other direct
or circumstantial evidence of the corpus delicti. Gilbert v. Com., 111 Ky. 793.
But these distinctions are here unimportant, as the rule seems superfluous in
either form.
The rule is based on the inherent weakness of such confessions as evidence
(State v. Stephen, 11 Ga. 225) and the fact that false confessions are not
easily rebutted as is direct or circumstantial evidence of occurrencqs (as dis-
tinguished from words). White v. State, 49 Ala. 344. But these bases for the
rule seem unsound. There is a direct conflict of opinion as to whether the
evidence is weak or strong. Blackstone holds' it weak. 4 Black. Comm. 357.
Gilbert considers it the strongest kind of evidence. Gilbert Evid. 123. Regina
v. Baldry, 2 Den. Cr. Cas. 430. Hopt v. U. S., 574, 504. Furthermore it is
universally held inadmissible, if induced by hopes of favor or fear of punish-
ment. U. S. v. Bram, 168 U. S. 532.
The rule seems ta have. originated as a humanitarian rule at a time when
the accused could not be a witness for himself, had no right to process to
compel the attendance of witnesses, had no right to counsel or right 6f appeal,
but all these rights have at the present time been given him. Wigmore, 33 Am.
Law Rev. 376, 384 et seq. Instances of miscarriage of justice due to uncor-
roborated confessions are exceedingly rare and all arose in England before the
above-mentioned rights were given. III Wigmore Evidence 2794, note 4.
The weakness of confessions, if any exists, is not in the confession itself, but
in the reports and testimony given in regard thereto. Erle. J., in Reg. v. Baldry,
2 Den. A. C. 446. This danger of falsification of testimony as to confession
it seems is minimized by giving the accused the right to counsel and process.
The rule is purely theoretical. In the previous reported cases there are none
where there have not been some corroboration. People v. Hennessy, 15 Wend.
149. It seems impossible to imagine a case where the confession if true could
not be corroborated. Hence it seems the only effect of the rule is to lead the
court into error and thus secure retrial. And where the court correctly lays
down the rule it seems that the jury may often be confused thereby and fail to
convict when they might justly have done so.
Hence it seems that the rule is not founded in reason, is unnecessary, and
is a device for unscrupulous counsel to secure delay or acquittal by trapping the
court or the jury. The principal case seems an excellent example of such delay.
W. C. DALZELL, Palo Alto, California.
FORMER JEOPARDY.
Morris v. State. 90 S. E. 361. A conviction by a municipality will not bar
an action by the state for the same act, providing that there enters some es-
sential ingredient in the ordinance which is lacking in the state law.
This case is supported by practically all the authorities that allow a muni-
cipality to pass an ordinance, which is practically the same as the state law,
and it is the great weight of authority that a municipality has that power.
There is no question as to the power if the intention of the Legislature is to
grant it
Assuming that the municipality has the power to pass the ordinance, the
question naturally arises whether the person convicted in a, municipal court
may be tried for the same act under a state law substantially the same, if he
pleads the constitutional provision of a "former jeopardy" for the same offense.
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The great weight of American authority is to the effect that he may be
tried under both the ordinance and statute. Most of the decisions so holding
'are based on the reasoning that the state and municipality are separate sovereign-
ties. Mayor v. Allaire, 14 Ala. 400; Bueno v. State, 40 Fla. 160, 23 So. 862;
Ambrose v. State, 6 Ind. 351; Repass v. Commonwealth, 107 Ky. 139; Miss. v.
Johnson, 59 Miss. 543; State v. Reid, 115 N. C. 741, 20 S. E. 468; Kock v. State,
53 Ohio St. 433, 41 N. E. 689; Anderson v. O'Donnell, 29 S. C. 355; Greenwood
v. State, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 567; Hamilton v. State, 3 Tex. App. 643; Ex Parte
Simmons, 4 Okla. 662; State v. Sly, 4 Ore. 277; Town of Van Buren v. Wells,
53 Ark. 368. Other jurisdictions and many of the above hold that the action
under the ordinance is in the nature of a civil action to recover a penalty and
hence no bar to a criminal action by the state. Levy v. State, 6 Ind. 281;
Hughes v. People, 8 Colo. 536.
Many of the cases cited by the books-as authority for the above proposition
are not in point in that the state law is a felony, while the municipal by-law is a
misdemeanor. Robbins v. People, 95 Ill. 175; State v. Lee, 29 Minn. 445, 13
N. W. 913.
Michigan, Connecticut and Missouri were the only states against the weight
of authority for many years. People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611; State v.
Welch, 36 Conn. 216; State v. Simmons, 3 Mo. 414; State v. Cowan, 29 Mo.
330.
Alabama, Arkansas and Texas have reversed their former rule, which
followed the weight of authority, by statute. Ark. Statute acts 1891, pp. 97,
Sec. 1; Ratley v. State (Ala.), 16 So. 147; Cast v. State (Ala.), 65 So. 718;
Davis v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 359, 39 S. W. 937.
Missouri, which held contra to the weight of authority consistently, recently
apparently reversed itself in State v. Muir, 86 Mo. App. 642.
The reason for the two sovereignty theory is that the courts applied the
analogy to the United States and the State courts trying a person -for the
same act. This analogy does not appear to me to be supportable. While
there is no doubt as to the rule in the State and the Federal cases it does
not appear clear why the courts should use those decisions as a rule on
which to base the decision in municipal and state cases. It is generally and
correctly stated that a municipal corporation is created by the state to aid in
the management of the affairs of the state, and is generally considered as the
agent of the state., In State v. Cowan, sitpra, it was said: "To hold that he can
be (convicted by both state and municipality) would be to overthrow the
power of the assembly to create corporations to aid in the management of
the affairs of state. For the power in the state to punish, after punishment
has been inflicted by the corporate authorities, could only find support in the
assumption that all the proceedings on the part -of the corporation were null
and void."
The rule that the municipal by-law action is civil is historical. Anciently
in England a municipal corporation could not, by a by-law, authorize an indict-
ment or summary prosecution, nor could it provide either for imprisonment
or disfranchisement for disobedience. The ancient by-law used to direct that,
for a breach of its provision, the offender forfeit a sum named. This-'for-
feiture could not be recovered in the .Mayor's court but was recoverable in
an action of debt, or sometimes assumpsit in one of the Westminster Hall
Courts. Bishop Statutory Crimes, 4th Ed., Sec. 403.
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For other authorities on the principal proposition see 12 Cyc. 288; Dillon
on Municipal Corporations 4th Ed. Sec. 368 and note; Cooley on Constitu-
tional Limitations, 4th Ed., 239 and 240 and note.
F. M. OSTRANDE, Palo Alto, California.
FROM WILLIAM G. HALE
CONFESSIONS.
State v. Maranda. Ohio 114 N. E. 1038. Corpus delicti. (1) An extra-
judicial confession is not sufficient in and of itself to'sustain a conviction of a
crime. (2) Some corroborating circumstances tending to 'prove criminal agency,
which is one of the elements of the corpus delicti, should be offered by the
state before such extra-judicial confession is competent. In this case the de-
fendant was charged with arson, and there was, apart from the confession,
evidence that the buildings were burned and some evidence tending to show
that the fires were not accidental. The confession, therefore, was admissible.
INDICTMENT.
United States v. Gaaji, 237 Fed. 728. Allegation of offense as of a day
certain. In an indictment for giving an order for opium and failing to pre-
serve a duplicate thereof in such a way as to be readily accessible, in violation
of the Anti-Drug Act (Dec. 17, 1914, c. 1. 38 Stat. 875), time is of the essence,
since the offense can be committed only within two years after the acceptance
of the order. The indictment must, therefore, allege that the offense was com-
mitted within the essential period, or it fails to allege an offense. The proof,
however, need not correspond with the averment, with exactness. The proof
may be of any day within such two-year period. The following language from
the opinion is of interest: "The general rule is that, even though a grand jury
has not evidence of the exact date of an offense, and though its oath is to true
presentment make, and though time be not of the essence, it must in the indict-
ment allege the offense of a day certain. To escape the sometime difficulty
thus created is another and necessary rule that at trial the day alleged may be
disregarded, and the offense proven as of any day prior to indictment and
within limitations. Perhaps the interests of both accuser and accused and good
pleading require that the indictment shall definitely allege the date of the offense
when known. But to compel it to be alleged when unknown often defeats the
objects of the requirement, is illogical, falsified by the proof, and works to the
prejudice of both parties and to the impairment of justice. At any rate, the
first rule is emasculated, "weaseled," by the second, and in the main is but a
technicality of time-honored precedent. So in England -and elsewhere are
statutes that no indictment shall be holden insufficient for failure to allege the
time, or for erroneous allegation thereof, when time is not of the essence. And
under such circumstances the allegation is so far of form, rather than of
substance, that it is believed to be within section 1025, R. S. (Comp. St., 1913,
Par. 1691), nullifying defects of form and accomplishing the same statutory
end."
EVIDENCE.
People v. Halpin. Ill. 114 N. E. 932. Cross-examination. The cross-
examination of a witness as to his occupation, associations, and -conduct, and
also as to other things immaterial to the issues, to determine his credibility, is
largely in the discretion of the court, and does not constitute error, unless the
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discretion is abused. In this case it was brought out on cross-examination that
one of the witnesses for the defendant kept saloons, allowed women in them,
ran houses of prostitution, etc.
PERJURY.
People v. Ashbrook. Ill. 114 N. E. 922. Indictment. An indictment for
perjury may either allege that the false testimony was material, or set forth the
fajcts showing its materiality, and so an indictment, charging that the defendant
committed the crime of -perjury by falsely testifying that he had not illegally
sold intoxicants, in a prosecution against him for such illegal sale, is sufficient,
though merely alleging that the testimony was material. Nor need it be alleged
that the testimony was feloniously given. The indictment was in the words of
the statute and every indictment is to be deemed sufficiently technical and
correct which alleges and charges the offense in. the language of the statute
creating the offense.
RAE.
People v. Kingcannon. Ill. 114 N. E. 508. Sufficiency of indictment. A
count in an indictment charging statutory rape without force, which failed to
allege that the prosecutrix was not the wife of the accused, was fatally de-
fective on motion in arrest of judgment.
I Duplicity., As every indictment for rape, if sufficient, includes the charge
of assault with intent to commit rape, where a count in an indictment for rape
charged specifically both the offenses of rape and assault with intent to com-
mit rape, it was not bad for duplicity and was good as against a motion to quash.
Evidence. In a statutory. rape case, evidence that the defendant, the
putative father had, or had had, supernumerary fingers, and that the child also
had them, is competent as tending to show the paternity of the child, when
accompanied by further evidence that supernumerary fingers are usually hered-
itary, and by the positive testimony of, the prosecutrix that the defendant is
the father of the child.
People v. Moore. Ill. 114 N. E. 906. Complaint by prosecutrix. In a
prosecution for rape, a complaint made by the prosecutrix is admissible as cor-
roborative of her testimony, because it is the natural and spontaneous expression
of feelings; but such complaint made in answer to questions is inadmissible.
In this case the complaint was in response to the question, "What are you
crying about?" Held, error, but harmless error, since conviction was of assault
with intent to raipe and not to rape.
